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capacity – core concepts of the early small state literature – have dominated the discipline 
ever since. It also explores how realism, liberalism and constructivism respectively approach 
the study of small states. However, we also outline how the focus has over time slowly 
shifted from the challenges associated with smallness to opportunities. There is considerable 
literature across various disciplines that helps us to better understand small states in 
International Relations; but there remains a largely unexplored field of inquiry about small 
states which needs to be thoroughly examined and theorised. Studies of small states have 
never been as relevant as today, given the increasing number of small states and with many 
small territories that are potential candidates for independence. 
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Introduction 
 
The world continues to be dominated by large powers and is presently led by 
unpredictable actors such as the United States (US) and Russia. Political instability 
characterizes Brazil and India and there is no consensus as to where China may be heading. 
Moreover, all states are today facing such new challenges as climate change-related natural 
disasters, cyber warfare, the rise of terrorism, refugee crises and online propaganda 
campaigns. At the same time, there have never been so many small sovereign states in the 
international system and a vast number of small territories are candidates for independence, 
which would grant them equal status with the 194 large and small member states of the 
United Nations (UN).  
 
Where does this challenging situation leave the current small sovereign states? What 
have small state studies contributed to our understanding of the small state from their 
foundation in the late 1950s and 1960s? How can small state studies help us evaluate 
challenges and opportunities that small states face, now and in the foreseeable future?   
 
This essay offers a timely overview of the development of small state studies. We 
begin our survey by examining the first comprehensive work on small states in the 
international system by Baker Fox in 1959. We identify core concepts of the early small state 
literature, vulnerability and a lack of capacity, and examine how they have dominated the 
discipline ever since. On the other hand, we recognize how the literature’s focus has over 
time shifted from the challenges associated with smallness to opportunities and that there is 
considerable literature across various disciplines that helps us to better understand and think 
with and about small states. We outline how the main international relations theories 
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(realism, liberalism and constructivism) approach small states and identify a gap in how they 
treat the size of states. In spite of the proliferation of small states on the world stage, there 
continues to be a glaring lack of studies and theories that frame size as a key variable when 
seeking to explain, compare or forecast the behaviour of small states. Accordingly, two recent 
and explicit international relations (IR) theoretical treatments of small states – the application 
of status-seeking and shelter theory – are identified for special scrutiny. 
 
In our assessment, there are clear disadvantages and advantages to being small. The 
disadvantages can be related to inbuilt weaknesses of small states and adverse international 
conditions. Accordingly, we outline a number of strategies that small states have adopted in 
order to be successful. Furthermore, we note that international conditions since the end of 
World War II in 1945, and in particular after the end of the Cold War in 1989, have never 
been so favourable to small states. Moreover, scholars of small states are providing us with 
new and important tools to examine world affairs.  
  
This paper is divided into four sections: defining the small state, findings on small 
states, IR theory and small states, and the latest theoretical developments in small state 
studies. To conclude, the future of small state studies is discussed. 
 
Defining the small state 
 
Over time, scholars have considered the benefits of large societies as compared to 
small societies. Some of the disadvantages of small size are intuitive and based on common 
sense, such as a lack of military heft. Others, such as limited diplomatic resources, have until 
recently largely been neglected by the literature.  
 
Most studies of small states begin by trying to define them and considering whether 
they are a unique category worthy of study. Population size is the most common single 
variable in defining the size of states. Most studies in political science and economics 
categorise small states as having resident populations below 10 or 15 million (Armstrong & 
Read, 2000; Jalan, 1982; Katzenstein, 1984; 1985; Kuznets, 1960; Ross, 1983; Vital, 1967). 
However, other studies place the threshold as low as one million (Easterly & Kraay, 2000) or 
one and a half million (Butler & Morris, 2017).  
  
Size of economy (GDP) and territory are also commonly used to define state size 
(Archer & Nugent, 2002). However, territory and economy are not particularly useful on their 
own. Having a small territory creates some advantages and disadvantages but these 
challenges are not particularly pronounced. It is possible for a state with little territory to have 
a large population, economy and military capability; and thus, be powerful. On the other 
hand, states with extensive territory can also have little power. Territory does not necessarily 
imbue states with strengths in the same way that a large population and economy does. 
Possessing a small economy does come with significant challenges but this does not 
necessarily create insurmountable hurdles. By adopting appropriate policies or stumbling 
upon the right resources, a poor state with a large population can vastly increase the size and 
scope of its economy, reducing the economic challenges that come with a small economy, as 
shown by the rise of China. On the other hand, while small states can be wealthy, they remain 
reliant on trade access and the goodwill of other states in the international system. 
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Population size creates special static advantages, disadvantages and needs. If a state 
has a small population, whether or not the state is a tiny enclave or controls a vast expansive 
territory, and whether or not the state is extraordinarily rich or deeply impoverished, the small 
population creates certain needs and challenges that have to be compensated for. A state with 
a small population will find it hard to field a large military force with diverse capabilities. Its 
economy is furthermore bound to be small, which leads the small state to depend on foreign 
trade and be vulnerable to international economic fluctuations (Katzenstein, 1984, 1985). 
Small population size also creates constraints on the size and skill set of a state’s diplomatic 
forces (Corbett & Connell, 2015).  
 
A small population and a small economy inevitably set limits on the military and 
diplomatic resources which are at the disposal of the state. Small states lack the resources and 
manpower to wield large militaries and lack the power to force other states to succumb to 
their will. Moreover, small states may not be able to defend themselves from hostile attacks 
and rely on other states and international organisations for defence and diplomatic support 
(Vayrynen, 1971; Handel 1981; Thorhallsson & Bailes, 2016).  
  
One of the most comprehensive studies of the advantages and disadvantages of size is 
Alesina and Spolaore’s book, Size of nations. The authors propose that the optimal size of 
nations is the result of a trade-off between the advantages of being large and the costs that 
come with a greater disposition towards pluralism and heterogeneity in a larger state. In short, 
small size leads to less relative prosperity and greater insecurity, but has the upside of citizens 
more likely to be satisfied with the ways in which resources are distributed in their society. 
The authors argue that the economic advantages of size are manifest through larger domestic 
markets, less reliance on trade and economies of scale which provide public goods at cheaper 
costs. Another advantage of a large economy is its greater productivity, efficiency, innovation 
and sectoral diversity. Large states are less vulnerable to fluctuations in the international 
economy, given their lower reliance on trade and foreign investment. Large states are also 
able to recover more quickly from declines in specific sectors and regions: workers can leave 
high-unemployment for low-unemployment regions, and the state can redistribute resources 
from booming to busting regions.  
  
Katzenstein’s (1984, 1985) ground-breaking work suggests that, due to their reliance 
on free trade and thus exposure to international economic fluctuations, small states respond to 
these vulnerabilities through democratic corporatism. Governments, labour unions and 
employer associations come together to iron out deals that give small states the flexibility to 
respond quickly to changing conditions with the consent of all major stakeholders. Moreover, 
Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998) argue that the most open economies tend to have robust 
welfare programmes and substantial government spending as a way to satisfy or assuage 
those domestic groups most vulnerable to the effects of international economic fluctuations.
  
In the post-Cold War era, small states’ scholars have combined ‘new variables’ such 
as perception/image with traditional variables (size of population, economy, territory and 
military) and have shifted their focus from the power that the state possesses to the power that 
the state exercises. They claim that existing definitions of small size fail to fully account for 
the reality facing small states in the modern world. For instance, Wivel and Mouritzen (2005, 
p. 4) set aside the pursuit of a universal definition of small states and opt instead to think of 
small size as relational. A state can be weak in one relation but at the same time powerful in 
another. Small states are the weaker actors in asymmetrical power relationships. and weak 
enough to be unable to change such relationships. Accordingly, Denmark is the weaker 
partner in the Danish-German relations but Denmark is the stronger component in the 
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Danish-Icelandic relations. Also, a great power is a state whose policy may fundamentally 
alter a regional and world setting: a German decision to leave the European Union would 
radically alter the European order. On the other hand, a decision in Copenhagen to leave the 
EU would manly affect Denmark itself and only have minor consequences for the Union (e.g. 
Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; Wivel, Bailes and Archer, 2014). Furthermore, four of 
Europe’s smallest states (San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein and Andorra) are seen by many 
scholars and policy-makers as too small to join the EU. They do not have the capacity to take 
an active part in its decision-making. Simultaneously, small states such as Malta and Latvia 
can take part in the EU’s work without much difficulty (Thorhallsson 2006). Moreover, 
Ingebritsen (2006) claims that small states can become ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and lead by 
example internationally by using domestic specialisation and associated positive image: 
building on their good image within the UN has managed to convince other states to follow 
their example concerning women’s rights and environmental protection.   
 
A multifunctional framework, including six categories, for defining the size of states 
has also been proposed (Thorhallsson, 2006). In this schematic framework, fixed size refers to 
the population size and territorial size of the state; sovereignty size refers to the ability of 
small states to maintain sovereignty over their territory and govern it competently; while 
political size refers to the military and administrative capabilities of the state, the ability of 
the state to form a foreign policy consensus and the ability to have the domestic cohesion 
needed to tackle various problems. Economic size refers to the size of the state’s gross 
domestic product and development status; while perceptual size refers to the political 
discourse and self-perceptions that leaders, elites, groups and the public have of their own 
states. Small states that perceive themselves as influential actors with a role to play in world 
politics may be more successful in making a mark, whereas small states that do not believe 
that they can ever be influential on the world stage end up victims of this self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Perceptions by outside actors of the state in question are also important. Finally, 
preference size refers to the specific ideas, ambitions and priorities that elites in the state have 
and how expansive they are (Thorhallsson, 2006). 
 
Findings on small states  
 
Small state literature owes its origins and initial spurt to the post-1945 de-colonisation 
process and the Cold War. The core concepts of the literature – vulnerability and a lack of 
capacity – bear the hallmarks of this time. The main focus was on the security of the small 
state in hard military and economic terms (Baker Fox, 1959; Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004). 
Scholars argued that small states needed to join alliances to survive, in both political and 
economic terms (Keohane, 1969; Handel, 1981; Archer & Nugent, 2002). Small states could 
not muster the resources to be sustainable on their own, unlike large states (Vital, 1967). 
 
Globalisation and the post-Cold War order have challenged these ‘deficit’ based 
assumptions. Already in the mid-1970s, the bold assertion that ‘small is beautiful’ was 
gaining traction (Schumacher, 1973). By the 1980s, small state studies began shifting focus to 
explanations of small state success and prosperity, attributing these to innovative, nimble and 
flexible responses to globalisation (Katzenstein, 1984, 1985; Briguglio, Cordina & Kisanga, 
2006; Cooper & Shaw, 2009). The focus shifted again with the occurrence of the 2008 
Financial Crisis when the vulnerability of small states, and the disadvantages and needs that 
were inherent to small economies in a globalised world, were highlighted. The literature dealt 
with central administrative competence and manoeuvring in order to limit the exposure of 
small states to global markets, and any ensuing damage (World Bank, 2016; Briguglio et al., 
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2010, Pétursson & Ólafsson, 2014), as well as reliance on the EU and the IMF to cope with 
the aftermath of crisis (Panke, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2011; Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012).  
 
While there has been a focus on military insecurity and economic vulnerability, the 
classic small state literature has not paid sufficient attention to ‘new’ threats and risks, which 
include human and animal epidemics, cyber security, infrastructure breakdowns, interruptions 
of supply and natural disasters. Indeed, actual policy-making in many small states has shown 
less concern with military security and instead has emphasised ‘soft’ threats from the effects 
of increased globalisation, non-state violence and environmental degradation.  
  
To respond to these security threats, small states typically have to rely on cooperation 
with other states, often through international organisations. Small states may seek out a 
protector state, such as the world powers of the United States and China, the regional 
superpowers of Germany and France or former colonial powers. Small states may also make 
use of regional and international organisations to solve these soft security problems. For 
European small states, the EU’s specialization in soft security matters has made it an 
important avenue to take on board responsibilities that the small states could not, or did not 
want to, do on their own. Small states can, through the EU, make use of its pooled assets and 
regulatory framework to address issues in soft security fields, such as border management, 
law and order, natural disaster response and pandemic control (Bailes & Thorhallsson, 2013). 
 
This raises the question of the role that small states can play in regional and 
international organisations. One of the most intensely studied aspects of small states concern 
their ability, or lack thereof, to influence international outcomes from within international 
organisations. There are a number of studies on small states involved in disputes with larger 
states, as well as comprehensive studies of small states within particular regional and 
international bodies, such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the European Union 
(see Thorhallsson, 2017, for an overview of the literature). Small states generally face 
structural weaknesses within these bodies, but they can nevertheless use a number of 
strategies to wield influence. The vulnerabilities of small states primarily revolve around their 
limited administrative resources, weak bargaining power, and institutional arrangements that 
are biased in favour of the most powerful states. However, the literature suggests that small 
states can be influential by prioritising core interests, banking on the informality and 
flexibility of their diplomatic corps, relying on the expertise and advocacy of institutional 
bodies (such as the Commission in the EU or the Secretariat in the UN) and other states, and 
honing images of themselves as neutral, trustworthy, honest, compliant and useful brokers 
and contributors (Thorhallsson, 2000; Bunse, Magnette & Nicolaïdis, 2005; Naurin & 
Lindahl, 2010; Panke, 2010; Gron, 2014; Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017).  
 
One of the chief disadvantages of large size in Alesina and Spolaore’s framework 
(2003) is the increased disposition towards societal heterogeneity, which refers to the degree 
to which citizens and groups in a particular country disagree among themselves about their 
government’s policies. In a larger state, preference heterogeneity is likely to widen: having a 
larger citizenry tends to lead to more assorted cultures, more divergent ideologies and greater 
sectoral diversity. As a result, it becomes harder for a central government to accommodate 
groups and individuals to the same degree as is possible in small states. Government policies 
may sometimes be zero-sum, which means that satisfying one group invariably means 
dissatisfying others (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). For example, implementing protective tariffs 
for producers of a given product may increase costs for consumers and adversely affect 
domestic sectors that use the products. Tariffs on steel can protect domestic producers of steel 
while harming consumers, as well as the sectors that make use of steel (Read 2005). 
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Small state scholars have steadily shifted their focus towards domestic policy-making 
in small states. Opportunities and challenges in how states function in relation to a small 
population have come under scrutiny. For instance, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) suggest that 
there may be a larger democratic deficit in larger states than in small states. They suggest 
that, the larger the electorate, the less the vote of a single citizen counts, and that this makes 
large states less democratic. However, there are questions as to whether this is right but also 
as to whether there are advantages to democracy in large states. As Edlin, Gelman & Kaplan 
(2007) point out, even though a single citizen is less likely to be the decisive vote in a large 
democracy, if the citizen is the deciding vote, he/she will have a positive impact on a vastly 
larger group of people. Small states and their leaders are more vulnerable to coercion and are 
more exposed to actions that occur outside their territory; and so they are less able to shape 
their own outcomes and address international political and economic crises than their 
counterparts in large states. Thus, citizens of large states are in more control over their 
destiny. As a result, whether or not a small state prospers depends not so much on the actions 
taken by its government, but on regional and global processes and foreign actions that the 
citizens and leaders of small states are unable to influence. 
 
Research has also has raised concerns about the quality of democracy in small states. 
Erk and Veenendaal (2014) and Corbett (2015) argue that several Pacific micro-states suffer 
from democratic problems. While these states are formally democratic, the way that politics 
in these states is practised falls short of democratic ideals as theorised in the West. While 
micro-states have regular elections, a free press and constitutional courts, their electoral 
campaigns may not revolve around political issues, local media is not independent of 
politicians, and local politics may revolve around intimidation, cronyism and “spoils politics” 
(Buker, 2001). Smallness may, via homogeneity and a lack of diverse factions, undermine the 
quality of democracy. There is, therefore, something to the Hamiltonian argument that a 
political system with a multitude of diverse factions can increase the quality of political 
discourse, encourage policy-driven compromise and restrain tyrannous factions and despots. 
  
The Founding Fathers of the US felt that a large population and diverse factions were 
potential boons; but earlier Republican thinkers felt that large states were incompatible with 
democracy. Collective action was deemed harder in large societies, and that despots could 
therefore rule with greater ease (Baldacchino, 2009, 2012). In a large state, it is harder for a 
significant share of the population to rise up at the same time against government overreach, 
and so it would be easier for rulers to quell civil unrest there (Deudney, 2007). 
  
Does preference heterogeneity drive citizens to desire secession? And does it have 
negative effects on society and politics? After all, a greater diversity of opinions might lead to 
more innovation and tolerance. Research on the effects of diversity is mixed: some research 
suggests adverse effects on social capital, public goods provision and institutional quality 
(Algan, Hémet, & Laitin, 2016; Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016), while other studies locate no 
effect or find positive impacts (Clark, Lawson, Nowrasteh, et al., 2015; Padilla & 
Cachanosky, 2018). Preference heterogeneity is also malleable: the processes of nation-
building and assimilation can usher a greater convergence of political and social views. 
Wimmer (2016), for instance, argues that the relationship between diversity and low public 
goods provision may be spurious; the states that successfully managed to assimilate distinct 
groups chanced to be strong, whereas weak states were unable to assimilate diverse groups. 
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IR theory and small states 
 
To consider small states’ role in the world, it is helpful to rely on international 
relations theories that can provide simplified frameworks for interpreting the infinitely 
complex world of states, international organisations and other world actors. Realism, 
liberalism and constructivism provide the three simplest yet comprehensive frameworks for 
simplifying the world in a way that gives us explanatory power. 
  
Elman (1995) lamented that IR theory had largely ignored small states. Given the 
focus on systemic theories, the focus on great powers – the states that, on their own, can 
strongly shape international outcomes – is quite understandable. But: could the theoretical 
frameworks created to explain the behaviour of great powers also be used to explain the 
behaviour of smaller states? Several realists argued that they were:  indeed, small states 
should act in a manner most consistent with structural theories, such as neorealism, because 
they lacked the kind of leeway or policy space to let their leaders take unwise decisions that 
harmed the security of the state. Connecting small states’ vulnerability to coercion, they are 
less prone to make risky and erroneous foreign policies. 
 
Realism 
 
In the realist framework, cooperation between states is hard (for a number of reasons), 
fears of being cheated and coerced are significant, and states consequently seek power to 
protect themselves (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). In the realist view, the role of small 
states in international politics is highly circumscribed, with small states being primarily 
pawns in great power games. Therefore, they find niches and rely on a large state for security 
and goods, if the small states happen to be strategically important; otherwise, small states 
without strategic importance will have less room for manoeuvre and a greater dependence on 
the goodwill and mercy of larger powers.  
  
The classic position on realist thinking about the question of power and size is offered 
by the Athenian diplomats in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian war. As the diplomats put it, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must.” Realists are sceptical that international law and organisations can pacify 
state behaviour and make states respect agreements. Nor do states abide by norms unless 
these handily fit their underlying interests. Globalisation and economic interdependence do 
not change the fears and distrust of states, and the logic the leads them to accumulate power 
stands. As a result, realists expect more security competition and instability (Mearsheimer, 
2010). Thus, due to small states’ lack of military muscle, diplomatic power and economic 
leverage, small states are highly vulnerable to coercion and conquest (Vital, 1967). 
  
Leeway for small states is clearly limited in the realist world. And yet, states can 
cooperate via alliance formation (Waltz, 1979), thus surviving and prospering through 
strength in numbers and within alliances and through the protection offered by benign larger 
powers, provided that small states serve a purpose for these larger patrons. How small states 
mitigate their inherent insecurity is a point of contention among realists, as they debate 
whether small states either tag along with threatening and dominating powers or balance and 
align against them (Walt, 1987; Levy, 1989; Labs, 1992).  
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A number of small states scholars have in recent years used realist approaches to 
explain the foreign policy behaviour of small states. For instance, Mouritzen and Wivel 
(2005; 2012) rearticulate the classical realist concern with geopolitics to explain how the 
policies of neighbouring great powers affect small state diplomacy inside and outside 
international institutions. Pedersen (2018) takes inspiration from Mearsheimer’s offensive 
realism to explain Nordic status-seeking. Moreover, it had been posited by scholars that small 
states would act in greater accordance with neorealism than larger states (Jervis, 1978, pp. 
172-173; Snyder,1991, p. 20;  Schweller, 1992, p. 267). They argued that small states’ 
vulnerability to conquest made them more attuned to systemic incentives and less susceptible 
to domestic pressures, as small states could not afford to make foreign policy mistakes. 
However, Steinsson (2017) and Wivel (2013) rely on neoclassical realist approaches to show 
that domestic politics is still an important element in the foreign policies of small states. 
Neoclassical realism posits that states seek to defend their long-term security interests but 
that the pursuit of security interests will be distorted in the short-term by miscalculations by 
leaders and domestic politics. 
 
Steinsson (2017) shows that Iceland started the ‘cod wars’, a set of militarised 
interstate disputes with the United Kingdom, due to great domestic pressure on Icelandic 
leaders. Icelandic behaviour was largely inconsistent with neorealism, given that these 
disputes were extraordinarily risky and potentially highly costly for Iceland. In a separate 
study (Steinsson, forthcoming), it is also shown that liberal tripod of peace – democracy, 
institutions and trade – did not have a pacifying impact on conflict outbreak, but rather 
enflamed the disputes.  
 
Wivel (2013) uses neoclassical realism to show that Danish militaristic foreign policy 
has been highly influenced by liberal-egalitarian values and has not merely revolved around a 
pursuit of narrow security interests. Pedersen (2018), in a similar vein, argues that the 
motivations behind Nordic military activism are not solely ideational, but can be accounted 
for by realism. He argues that “the Nordic countries’ international engagement reflects a 
more instrumental and strategic motivation”, as they attempt to strengthen their reputations 
among allies, and increase the likelihood that the US and NATO protect them against 
external threats.   
 
Liberalism 
 
For liberals, there is more to international politics than power competition. The 
drivers of state behaviour are not the same that realists imagine them to be. This means that 
cooperation between states, regardless of their size, is possible and can be sustained, even in 
an anarchic world. Democracy, trade, and institutions mitigate the fears and uncertainty that 
anarchy gives rise to, and make sustained peaceful cooperation possible. In the modern 
international system, small and large states are increasingly locked into webs of institutional 
and interstate relations that create significant restraint, especially on large powers (Keohane 
& Nye, 2011).  
 
Small states are subsequently not just vulnerable pawns, but partners of sorts who are 
able to influence outcomes at the international level and clinch mutually favourable 
agreements with other states. Liberals certainly do see the relations between the liberal 
leviathan of the US and smaller states as lopsided in the former’s favour, but the leviathan 
restrains itself and provides order in a way that the small states consent to being subordinated 
(Ikenberry, 2001; Lake, 2009). Furthermore, small states scholars generally emphasise the 
importance of international institutions in the foreign policies of small states, and as ways in 
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which small states achieve favourable outcomes in an anarchic international system 
(Keohane, 1969). For instance, Katzenstein (1997) argues that small European states have 
sought to join the European Union in order to restrain Germany. Their support for the 
European project and willingness to transfer power to the EU institutions has to be 
understood in the light of their attempts to control outright German influence on their 
domestic affairs and to have a say in the development of the project. 
 
On the other hand, liberalism still holds that state behaviour is primarily driven by 
practical benefits and ideological affinity between states (Keohane & Nye, 2011). For 
instance, Ingebritsen (1998) shows how the European policy of the Nordic states has been 
heavily influenced by their primary economic sectors. In her analysis, she suggests that 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union because membership had clear 
economic benefits, for their leading economic sectors at the time of entry (e.g. the agrarian 
sector in Denmark and the manufacturing industries in Sweden and Finland) whereas Iceland 
and Norway have opted not to join the EU because it has not been obvious that it is 
economically beneficial to their leading economic sector (e.g. the fishing industry in Iceland 
and the petroleum industry in Norway). Gstöhl (2002) similarly argues that economic 
incentives are important to explain the European policy of Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, 
but that questions of national identity also matter. As a result, the aforementioned three states 
opted not to join the EU for a long period even though they had economic incentives to do so, 
because EU membership and its implications for national identity created domestic political 
hurdles. They did however enjoy favourable market access to the European market which 
was of utmost importance to them.  
 
Constructivism 
 
Various small state scholars have recently resorted to constructivist frameworks (de 
Carvalho & Neumann, 2015; Crandall & Varov 2016; Hedling & Brommesson, 2017; 
Wohlforth et al., forthcoming). Constructivism is not a theory in the same sense as liberalism 
or realism; but a framework that highlights the role of ideas and identities in shaping systems 
and individual behaviours. Consequently, states are not bound to respond to the dangers of 
anarchy in the ways that realists logically expect them to. States also do not simply pursue 
practical material benefits. Constructivists argue that states have agency and can respond in 
various ways depending on the identities and ideas that they have about themselves and 
others (Wendt, 1992; Hopf, 1998). As a result, constructivism is indifferent to the prospects 
of small states: these may find themselves in a world similar to that described by either 
realists or liberals. What constructivists do say is that the state behaviour shifts along with 
changes to their identities, interests and intersubjective beliefs. Constructivists also argue that 
there is more to power than material strength. After all, states and leaders can rely on soft 
power and the art of persuasion (Nye, 1990; Ingebritsen, 2002; Björkdahl, 2008).  
 
Recent theoretical developments  
 
We now identify two recent and explicit IR theoretical treatments of small states: the 
application of status-seeking to small states and shelter theory. The theory of status-seeking 
assumes that small states are deeply concerned, not with practical benefits and physical 
security, but with achieving status (de Carvalho & Neumann, 2015). On the other hand, the 
theory of shelter works on the assumption that small states are highly constrained by their 
vulnerabilities and that they lack discretion in their decision-making, but nonetheless also 
seek cultural goods (in addition to military, diplomatic and economic benefits) as part of the 
practical resources needed to maintain functional societies (Thorhallsson, 2010, 2011). 
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Status-seeking 
 
Literature, especially forthcoming from Nordic universities, has argued that the great 
powers are driven by status concerns, but this literature either ignored small and medium 
states or assumed that small states were unconcerned with the pursuit of status. However, 
recent scholarship has argued that the ‘status game’ is more important to small states because 
they are unable to compete or interact with other states in any other way (Wohlforth et al., 
forthcoming). A great power will be able to achieve status and be noticed regardless of what 
it does. Small states, on the other hand, will not be noticed unless they purposely seek out to 
be noticed (Wohlforth et al., forthcoming). 
  
According to these scholars, small states seek both status among their fellow small 
states, but also by the great powers. Small and middle powers seek status by taking on 
admirable tasks or excelling in a particular field. Wohlforth et al. (forthcoming, p. 6) write: 
 
The Netherlands is a traditional provider of international law, Switzerland specialises 
in third-party roles … Norway … has long sought to be identified as a do-gooder state. 
 
Some of the ways that small states gain moral authority is through helping the great 
powers maintain the existing international order, such as through mediation services, and 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. 
  
Given the background of most of the scholars who have written about status-seeking 
for small states, the primary focus has inevitably been on Norway (De Carvalho & Neumann, 
2015; Wohlforth et al., forthcoming). They see Norway as a small state which has managed, 
through status seeking, to become an active actor in international affairs:  
 
What has allowed Norway to gain such a position vis-à-vis its peers is less its national 
wealth in absolute terms … [but] the willingness to invest in visible international 
peace projects with guaranteed recognition from the US, combined with a strong 
willingness to use its disposable income on these projects (Wohlforth et al., 
forthcoming, p. 17). 
 
 Existing works on status-seeking both account for the ways in which small states 
dedicate resources to promote liberal democratic norms and values, as well as explain why 
small states may dedicate inordinate resources to military ends. A forthcoming study 
examines Danish and Norwegian military contributions and adventures, and notes the 
puzzling high costs that these small states have incurred are the result of the pursuit of 
prestige. These inordinate military expenditures are not rooted in a sense of insecurity or in a 
desire to maintain national security; rather, their goal is to improve their country’s standing in 
the eyes of Washington DC (Jakobsen et al., forthcoming). 
 
Shelter theory 
 
Shelter theory was created in an attempt to forecast and explain small state behaviour 
in the international system. The theory works on the assumption that small size confers 
inherent disadvantages (in relation to their small population, economy and public 
administration [including the foreign service] and limited military capacity), and that the 
solution to these disadvantages is to seek shelter by allying with large states and joining 
international organisations. Small states seek the political, economic and societal shelter 
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provided by larger states and international organisations in order to shield themselves from 
inbuilt structural weaknesses and a hostile international environment (Thorhallsson, 2010, 
2011).  
 
Political shelter refers to diplomatic or military backing by another state or an 
international organisation. It can also refer to the ways in which small states rely on 
international law and norms. Political shelter therefore reduces small states’ vulnerability to 
coercion, and increases their ability to achieve successful international outcomes. Small states 
lack the ability to field large militaries with diverse capabilities on their own. Along with 
reduced economic clout and fewer bureaucratic resources, this means that small states lack 
the ability to negotiate with other, larger states on an equal footing. However, through 
political shelter, small states secure the basics needed for their survival, while also attaining 
the ability to influence broader sets of issues on the international scene. 
 
Small states necessarily have small domestic markets, which creates a host of 
disadvantages and needs. First and foremost, small states are highly reliant on trade. They 
also tend to have less sectoral diversity, which means that they are reliant on one or a few 
major exports. This makes the economies of small states more vulnerable to shocks, as 
disruptions in trade or weaknesses in the main export sectors have national implications. As a 
result, the theory posits that small states will seek shelter in the international system by 
aligning themselves with large states and entities to reduce their vulnerability to inevitable 
fluctuations, thus ensuring stable trade relations and external assistance. Economic shelter 
may take the form of direct economic assistance, help from an external financial authority, a 
common market and favourable market access (Thorhallsson, 2011).  
 
Small-state theory has traditionally viewed the vulnerability of small states primarily 
in terms of economic and political elements. However, shelter theory considers that small 
states seek societal shelter to avoid isolation and social stagnation, and to overcome problems 
that stem from a lack of native knowledge. Relations with the outside world are essential 
since it is through constant interaction with other cultures, ideas and ideologies that a society 
evolves, is enriched and moves forward. Interactions with foreign cultures and individuals are 
consequently important to achieve a marketplace of ideas in the small state. It has been 
crucial to achieve access to networks where innovations and academic practices could be 
shared, and where scholars and students can access information that is often not available in 
the small state (Thorhallsson, Steinsson, & Kristinsson, forthcoming).  
 
Shelter theory has been applied to the history of Iceland’s external relations 
(Thorhallsson, 2012; Thorhallsson & Kristinsson, 2013; Thorhallsson & Joensen, 2014, 2015; 
Thorhallsson et al., forthcoming), as well as examined the shelter options and choices of the 
Nordic states (Thorhallsson & Bailes, 2017). These studies demonstrate that Iceland has 
cooperated extensively with neighbouring states and societies, and often benefitted from 
these interactions. This flies in the face of the nationalist narrative that Iceland succeeded 
when it stood on its own and declined when it relied on or was ruled by other states. Shelter 
theory has also been used to examine the alliance choices of Armenia, Cuba and Singapore 
(Bailes, Thayer & Thorhallsson, 2016), as well as the choices and opportunities for an 
independent Scotland, in the event that it became independent (Thorhallsson & Bailes, 2017). 
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Conclusion 
 
The mainstream literature on small states in the field of International Relations 
stresses the military and economic limits of small states. The core concepts of the literature 
are those of vulnerability and limited capacity, based on the traditional variables most often 
used to define the size of states: population, size of the economy, territorial size and small 
military. IR theorists (to the extent that they bothered at all to deal with small states) and 
small state scholars were mostly busy looking for policy responses which allowed small 
states to survive in the hostile international atmosphere of the Cold War. Such scholars 
largely subscribed to IR’s assumptions; until Katzenstein’s work argued that small Western 
corporatist states could better adjust to the international economy than their larger 
counterparts. 
 
Perception/image and the competence and reach of public administration (including 
the foreign service) are variables that have been recently added to the traditional list defining 
the small state and its opportunities and challenges (Bartmann, 2012). There is a growing 
literature on how small states use special characteristics of their public administration and 
positive image in particular policy fields to have a say in international organisations. Small 
state scholars are also observing the domestic features of the small state (such as the 
functioning of democracy and its implicit ‘separation of powers’) and no longer exclusively 
focus on its position and leverage in the international system.  
 
Only a brief, state-of-the-art analysis of small state studies has been indulged in this 
paper. The origins and evolution of the discipline have been charted and its shifting focus 
from challenges related to smallness to opportunities has been considered. A gap has also 
been identified in how International Relations theory treats small states. A general lack of 
understanding and appreciation within the IR community as to the importance of the size of 
states with respect to domestic decision making and overseas relations has been noted.  
 
Studies of small states have never been as relevant as today, especially in the wake of 
the record number of small states and with more small territories seeking, or in a position to 
consider, independence. Scholars of small states have challenging and exciting times ahead.  
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